Lecture

Explication Based Pluralism

Philosophy of Science Colloquium Talk

Date: Janury 23, 2025

Time: 16h45 - 18h15

Meetings are usually held on Mondays from 16:45 to 18:15 in Room 2G

Abstract:

Carnap emphasized that for a given explicandum, there is no such thing as the correct explicatum, but only one or more adequate explicata. This talk addresses two questions: In what ways can an explication problem have more than one solution? In what sense do multiple solutions to explication problems give rise to pluralism? Based on an analysis of the general structure of explications, I will first develop a systematic overview of the surprisingly many factors that can be responsible for multiple outcomes of an explication project. I will then suggest some conditions under which it is plausible to interpret multiple outcomes as giving rise to explication-based pluralism.

Report

Report for Project “Explication and Pluralism, with an Application to Logic”, January-March 2025

My project had two goals: first, to develop a systematic analysis of ways in which a task of explication can have more than one solution and give rise to conceptual pluralism; second, to apply and test this analysis in a case study on logical pluralism. I presented my ideas for the systematic analysis in the Philosophy of Science Colloquium and the colloquium of the Vienna Circle Society, and in reaction to the very helpful feedback, I reworked my ideas and spent the entire fellowship writing a paper “Explication as a Basis of Conceptual Pluralism”. The basic result is that explication-based conceptual pluralism can be explained as the view that, for the same task of explication, there can be alternative, equally adequate explicata which are coexisting or conflicting. I then argue that not only differences in meaning can be responsible for such pluralism, but also differences in terminology, conditions of adequacy or target systems of concepts. As a result, there are many scenarios of explication-based conceptual pluralism, e.g. avoidable conflicts, conflicting sharpenings, multiple-models idealization, compatible tasks and target-system diversity. 
My stay at the IVC was extremely productive thanks to the inspiring atmosphere, the many informal discussions and the interesting talks and colloquia related to the IVC and the Institute of Philosophy. I am very grateful for having had the opportunity to work at the IVC. 

Publication: 

Brun, Georg. 2026. “Explication as a Basis for Conceptual Pluralism”. Inquiry. doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2026.2617418.