Evelyn Erickson

August 04, until November 01, 2025

Affiliation: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (Brazil)

Research for a study about:

The ladenness of logical data: towards a robust reflective equilibrium

Recent approaches in the philosophy of logic have followed Quine's naturalism into claiming that logic and the natural sciences share the same epistemology and method of theory revision. These accounts face the problems of selecting neutral data and finding a non-question begging mechanism to perform the revision of logical theories. A rival account employs reflective equilibrium as a method of theory revision, and while not being prey to the logic in the background problem, faces a similar problem regarding identifying data. The present research project aims at investigating the common problem of lack of logical data, by starting from the assumption that logical data cannot be separated from our language, values, methods, instruments, and practices. Assuming the value ladenness and language ladenness of logic, a different picture emerges of what counts as data for logical theories and how theories are revised. In particular, it becomes necessary to incorporate historical aspects into the epistemology of logic. This account will be holistic in a sense, but not particularly Quinean. Logical knowledge is continuous with science; not within a hierarchy of justification, but rather as part of our knowledge as a whole, much like Neurath’s Ballungen and Catherine Elgin’s notion of cognitive system.

Lecture

Continuing Continuity with Science

Logik Café Lecture

Date: October 13, 2025

Time: 4.30 pm - 6 pm
Meetings are usually held on Mondays from 16:30 to 18:00 in Room tba, Department of Philosophy, NIG/ Neues Institutsgebäude, Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Vienna

Abstract:
Treating logical theories akin to scientific theories regarding revision has twice begged the question: first in selecting data and second in finding a mechanism with which to choose the best theory. This has happened due to the standpoint that both these aspects of theory choice should be neutral, and none could be found. If there is nothing neutral to find, then the discussion can be enriched by talking about how logical theories are laden. From this standpoint, logical evidence cannot be separated from the broader context in which our logical practices occur. The current talk will stretch the analogy of logic with science into the realm of value ladenness. If one accepts that logic is continuous with science, then one must be mindful of the language, methods, and values of our logical theories. 

Report

Recent approaches in the philosophy of logic have followed Quinean naturalism into claiming that logic and the natural sciences share the same epistemology and method of theory revision, and that some traditional properties of logic should be abandoned (such as aprioricity, epistemological analyticity, foundationalism, normativity). These accounts face the problems of selecting neutral data and finding a non-question begging mechanism to perform the revision of logical theories. A rival account employs reflective equilibrium as a method of theory revision, and while not being prey to the logic in the background problem, faces a similar problem regarding identifying data. The present research project aimed at investigating the common problem of lack of logical data, by continuing in the analogy between logic and science, pushing the discussion into the realm of value-ladenness. Starting from the assumption that logical data cannot be separated from our language, values, methods, instruments, and practices, the project relies on feminist epistemologies of science to overcome the fact/value dichotomy when it comes to theory selection, as a way to enrich the pool from which to draw evidence in logic. This way, the value ladenness of logic can be incorporated as a feature in the quest for finding evidence for theory revision and settling the problem of underdetermination of theories in logic. Assuming the ladenness of theories of logic, a different picture emerges of what counts as data for logical theories and how theories are revised. In particular, it becomes necessary to incorporate historical, cognitive and political aspects into the epistemology of logic. The view of logic that emerges is one in which logical knowledge is still continuous with science, and some traditional properties of logical theories are lost but not the ones usually claimed. In the account elaborated in this project, logical theories lose objectivity, generality, universality and topic neutrality, just as claimed by feminist theories of science.