The challenge of quantum mechanics to the limits of science and the Vienna Circle's response

Organized by Institute Vienna Circle and the Unit for Applied Philosophy of Science and Epistemology APSE together with the "Physics meets Philosophy in Vienna" group

Moderator: Iulian Toader

Date: 12/11/2020

Time: 15h00 - 17h00

Plattform: Moodle Collaborate | together with the Physics-meets-Philosophy-in-Vienna Group

Access: https://eu.bbcollab.com/guest/c8cdeaacf66140a5994605d5fff5cf25

Abstract:

The modern theory of quantum mechanics, developed in 1925-26, has often been seen as a positivistic theory, because of the central role of observations in the theory and the dismissal of questions about the reality of quantum processes independent of measurement. At the same time, in the 1920s and 1930s, it was often concluded that quantum mechanics implies that there is a limit to what can be known scientifically, and this opened the door to a wide range of speculations, in which quantum mechanics was connected with free will, organic life, psychology and religion – connections which were drawn not in the least by quantum physicists themselves. This tension is perhaps nowhere stronger than in the work of Pascual Jordan, one of the leading quantum physicists of the period, who emphasized the positivistic elements in quantum mechanics as well as using it as the basis for an extravagant theory about the essence of organic life and the psychology of the will, a theory which, moreover, had National Socialist overtones. It is thus no wonder that when Jordan published his quantum speculations in *Erkenntnis* in 1934, they were harshly criticized by members of the Vienna Circle. But although Jordan's claims could easily be dismissed, the resulting discussion (to which especially Moritz Schlick and Philipp Frank made extensive contributions) did reveal broader challenges posed by quantum theory: both Heisenberg's uncertainty relations and Bohr's notion of complementarity were often used to argue that there are fundamental limits to physical knowledge, and these possible limits to the scope and unity of science were more challenging to deal with for defenders of the scientific world view.