Academic Freedom and the Argument from Truth

APSE-CEU-IVC Talks
The Philosophy Department of the Central European University, the Institute Vienna Circle and the Unit for Applied Philosophy of Science and Epistemology (of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Vienna) are jointly organizing a series of talks this term

Date: 11/11/2021

Time: 15h00

Online Plattform: The meeting will be online via Zoom | Talks in Philosophy of Science and Epistemology PSE

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https://univienna.zoom.us/j/91658960832?pwd=MU13Q0htcmhjL3N1dG50azBUNFl6QT09

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Abstract:

Academic freedom has often been defended in a progressivist manner: without academic freedom, the advancement of knowledge, i.e. epistemic progress, would be in peril. In this paper, I want to critically discuss the limits of such a progressivist defense of academic freedom, also known as ‘argument from truth.’ The critique is offered, however, with a constructive goal in mind, namely to offer an alternative account that goes beyond mere reference to epistemic progress and involves reference to the freedom to think independently as the freedom we mean when we point to academic freedom. The resulting account is not only epistemologically stronger than a progressivist account, it also allows to counter the negation of academic freedom in the name of progress. The latter becomes key, for instance, when authoritarian political regimes limit academic freedom with reference to an epistemic progress suitably defined for that regime.