Are mathematical explanations causal explanations in disguise?

Philosophy of Science Colloquium
The Institute Vienna Circle holds a Philosophy of Science Colloquium with talks by our present fellows.

Date: 09/03/2023

Time: 15h00

This talk is going to be a hybrid event, in-person at NIG (SR 2i) and can be followed via online Plattform.

Online Plattform:

Access:

univienna.zoom.us/j/63035484129

Passcode: 226427

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Abstract:

There is currently a major debate in the philosophy of science as regards whether so-called ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’ (DMEs) are possible. Some DMEs, framed as conditionals, have been proposed as non-causal scientific explanations of the dynamics of complex systems. I argue that such DMEs are essentially causal explanations in disguise. This is because such explanations conceal various contingent and causal processes packaged into the conditional and packaging such processes into the conditional prevents them from being DMEs. 

I flesh out this view by discussing a putative DME which uses topology to allegedly explain the existence of at least two antipodal points on the earth with equal temperature and pressure. I demonstrate that the purported DME sneaks in contingencies pertaining to the global continuity of temperature in the associated conditional, by examining the theoretical and experimental evidence for temperature discontinuities in phase transitions, slip flows and micro-channel flows. I then argue that the idea that a variable like temperature is only contingently continuous can be extended to other physical variables, and this reveals a general problem for DMEs as ‘non-causal’ explanations of physical phenomena.