Quasi-analysis vs. Explication. The Early Carnap on Conceptual Engineering

Philosophy of Science Colloquium
The Institute Vienna Circle holds a Philosophy of Science Colloquium with talks by our present fellows.

Date: 16/01/2025

Time: 16h45

Venue: New Institute Building (NIG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, HS 2G

Abstract:

This paper calls into question the thesis that early Carnap’s rational reconstruction arises as a proto-version of his later and more mature idea of explication. The aim of the paper is to show that (1) according to the criteria of similarity, exactness, and fruitfulness, rational reconstruction qualifies as an explication, and that (2) according to their explanatory preconditions, rational reconstruction and explication emerge as processes of conceptual generalization and specification, respectively. To support (1), I consider rational reconstruction, in terms of early Carnap’s quasi-analysis, as a representational theory of mathematical structures; to support (2), I rely on formal concept analysis as a common framework for comparing conceptual constructions.