Quantum Propositions and Logical Monism

Philosophy of Science Colloquium
The Institute Vienna Circle holds a Philosophy of Science Colloquium with talks by our present fellows.

Date: 13/11/2025

Time: 16h45

Venue: New Institute Building (NIG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, HS 2i

Abstract:

In this talk, I will briefly present the formalism of standard quantum logics (QLs) and examine sui generis features that seem to set them apart from other non‑classical logics. I will focus on their being plausibly "discovered" and on their apparent lack of interpretative utility in the philosophy of physics. On the usual presentation, QLs are introduced via a set of experimental propositions ("physical qualities"), informally specified in natural language as a response to these peculiarities; this apparatus has been used to draw a tenuous link between the semantics of QLs and the interpretation of certain experimentally obtained yet conceptually problematic results in quantum mechanics. I argue that this apparatus is philosophically relevant only under a prior commitment to logical monism –indeed, logical monism holds iff the experimental‑propositions apparatus is in place– and I offer several critiques of both. Rejecting both the monist commitment and the apparatus allows a reassessment of the sui generis properties of QLs and their philosophical interpretation.