Leitgeb’s new verifiability criterion, probability, and thick concepts

Philosophy of Science Colloquium
The Institute Vienna Circle holds a Philosophy of Science Colloquium with talks by our present fellows.

Date: 26/06/2025

Time: 17h30

Venue: New Institute Building (NIG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, HS 3A

Abstract:

Hannes Leitgeb's recent paper "Vindicating the Verifiability Criterion" presents a new attempt at drawing out the exact sense in which (something like) verifiability is properly seen as the arbiter of meaningfulness. He proposes a parametrized, probabilistic verifiability criterion "scheme". As one of the advantages of his new criterion, compared to the "original" verifiability criterion, he advertises its greater flexibility, and the ability to account for, and make explicit (in terms of different parametrizations), the different ways in which certain statements can be meaningful for different communities.
The talk will present Leitgeb's ideas and raise to questions for them:1. One issue with the original criterion is the strong dichotomy between fact and value it entrenches, which e.g. Putnam argues makes it impossible for it to account for the specific way in which Thick Ethical Concepts are meaningful. Does the greater flexibility of Leitgeb's criterion allow it to give a satisfying account of judgments involving such terms?2. How does Leitgeb's probabilistic criterion interact with different concepts of probability? Are there specific requirements on a concept of probability which are necessary for the criterion to achieve its semantic bite?