Anti-Exceptionalism and the Problem of Abduction: Modelling in Logic and in Science

Philosophy of Science Colloquium
The Institute Vienna Circle holds a Philosophy of Science Colloquium with talks by our present fellows.

Date: 30/11/2024

Time: 15h00

Venue: New Institute Building (NIG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, SR 2H

Abstract:

Anti-exceptionalism is the view that logic is not special, that the methods — and perhaps the subject matter — of logic are continuous with other forms of inquiry, like the sciences. Logical theories, like scientific theories, are constructed on abductive or predictive grounds, evaluated based on whether they have the best fit with the data, as well as according to epistemic and non-epistemic virtues. In this way, logical theory-construction and theory-evaluation is of a piece with methods used in the sciences. The anti-exceptionalist slogan could be taken to be, 'if scientists can do it, we can do it too!'. The aim of this talk is to critically evaluate this anti-exceptionalist position from the point of view of contemporary philosophy of science. In the first half of the talk, I will raise a few issues that the anti-exceptionalist faces: there are problems concerning the nature of logical evidence, the function of abduction, and appeal to theoretical virtues. In the second half of the talk, I proceed more positively to argue that if we want to remain anti-exceptionalists, we can learn from the detailed work that philosophers of science have been doing on the nature of modelling practice.