Epistemic Conflicts: Permissibility and Incommensurability

Philosophy of Science Colloquium
The Institute Vienna Circle holds a Philosophy of Science Colloquium with talks by our present fellows.

Date: 24/10/2024

Time: 16h45

Venue: New Institute Building (NIG), Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, HS 2G

Abstract:

Sometimes we face choices in which the different values we subscribe to give us conflicting recommendations. This talk sets out to compare these value-conflict cases with so-called permissive cases, which are cases in which one body of evidence seemingly rationalizes multiple doxastic attitudes. The proposed resemblance arises from a similarity in the underlying conflicts displayed in these cases: while the former involve conflicting values, the latter involve conflicting epistemic standards. In both instances, we are faced with incommensurable alternatives which are supported by independent and non-directly comparable normative sources. By showing that permissive cases share the idiosyncratic features of comparisons under incommensurability, we gain a better understanding of numerous issues, such as the alleged arbitrariness of permissive attitudes. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that the proposed strategy is neutral regarding whether epistemic rationality is genuinely permissive. While some understandings of incommensurability support a permissive interpretation, others can be used to motivate impermissivism. This shifts the debate between permissivists and impermissivists by reducing normative questions about epistemic rationality to more fundamental questions about the nature of incommensurability.